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FOREWORD

CENSORSHIP & THE MEDIA* A FOREWORD
BARRY

P. McDONALD*

This symposium edition of the Notre DameJournalof Law, Eth-

ics & Public Policy focuses on issues that are of unquestionable
importance in a self-governing society that places a high value on
an uninhibited flow of human expression to make good decisions about how we live, and to fulfill our own personal strivings.
These issues concern the types of decisions that those who provide and control the mass channels of these flows make to regulate their content in different ways (including government actors
who may place restrictions upon them). They also concern the
legal, professional, economic, and other factors that influence
those decisions, and proposals about the way these factors themselves might be modified to result in decisions that are best for
all. This is serious business, because those who regulate the content of modern communications flows are deciding what many
citizens will see and hear about events of the world, in effect
shaping their opinions on key matters that individuals will eventually make important decisions about-not the least being
which elected representatives seem best equipped to address and
influence those events.
The articles presented in this edition deal with three critical
types of decisions that are made by media or government actors
regarding the content of communications flows. The first concern voluntary choices that media organizations make as to what
material, including both what they come into possession of and
generate themselves, they will present to the public. In other
words, these decisions regard what are frequently called choices
involving media self-censorship or the exercise of editorial discretion. The authors addressing this issue-Robert Sedler, Hannibal Travis, and Clay Calvert and Mirelis Torres-discuss the
range of legal and other factors that affect these choices, how
those factors can operate to foster both desirable and undesir*
Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Northwestern University, 1988.
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able decisions, and proposals regarding ways in which current
media decision-making can be improved.
The next type of censorial decision these articles address
concern decisions that media consumers themselves make, either
consciously or unconsciously. Here, contributing author George
Wright contends that in the process of choosing their content
sources, Internet users themselves effectively engage in self-censorship, weeding out disagreeable sources of views and information to the detriment of the individual user and public discourse
generally. Wright proposes a creative solution to this asserted
challenge.
The third and final type of censorship decision dealt with
herein concerns more traditional notions of that concept: restrictions on communication flows imposed by the government
rather than the media itself or consumers of it. Contributions in
this area by Derigan Silver, Kevin Saunders, and Terence Lau
examine, respectively, the age-old question of the best legal
approach for balancing national security concerns versus the
public's "right to know" in the more "new-age" context of terrorist trials, as well as more modern questions concerning the constitutionality of restrictions on sales of violent video games and
the desirability of proposed restrictions on the distribution of private information on the Internet.
All three of these types of alleged censorship involving various media present difficult and important legal and public policy
questions regarding the shaping of communication flows in our
society. I will examine each of the substantial contributions
made by our authors to these questions in more detail below.
PROBLEMS OF MEDIA SELF-CENSORSHIP

Robert Sedler very usefully leads off the discussion of media
self-censorship by organizing that phenomenon into two component parts-what he terms "bad" self censorship and "good" self
censorship-and arguing that the former is properly deterred,
and the latter properly fostered, by the United States Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. In Sedler's view, bad
self-censorship occurs in a wide variety of media when the producers and distributors of content are "chilled" into altering or
withholding it from the public by the prospect of legal sanctions
attaching to its communication. Amongst examples of such selfcensorship, Sedler cites Supreme Court decisions dealing with
laws giving political candidates a right of reply to attacks in newspapers that allegedly chilled the newspapers from publishing the
attacks in the first place, and laws setting up motion picture cen-
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sorship boards that allegedly chilled the making of movies containing non-obscene sexually explicit content. He argues that
Court-created law, such as the overbreadth doctrine and the
actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' deters

such undesirable self-censorship by establishing the "chilling
effect concept" as "the most fundamental and pervasive concept
in the 'law of the First Amendment." 2
On the other hand, according to Sedler, good self-censorship by the media, such as decisions to withhold the name of
rape victims or information that might harm national security
interests (in both cases, of course, where the costs of disclosure
are deemed to outweigh the public benefits), is also made possible by First Amendment protections-namely, a "right to silence"
embodied in Court decisions that have protected the exercise of
the media's editorial discretion to publish certain information or
not.' Sedler concludes that we rely on First Amendment law to
prevent the bad forms of media self-censorship, and to bring
about its good forms.
Sedler makes some very important points. Certainly a desire
to minimize the chilling effects of imprecise forms of speech regulations, including those that apply to the media, is a principal
driver in much of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Very recent examples of this include the Court's invalidation of a
federal law restricting the sale of animal cruelty videos that it
thought might chill the production and sale of hunting videos,'
and even its invalidation of a private tort verdict against offensive
funeral protesters in part on the unstated assumption that
allowing juries to determine what speech activities constitute outrageous conduct might chill protected speech on matters of public concern.' But while the First Amendment does much to
protect against undesirable media self-censorship resulting from
unduly imprecise or discretionary laws, we must not forget that
there are other non-legal causes of undesirable self-censorship
that are equally troublesome-at least as to the news media's
function of getting important information to the public, and to
other forms of media as well.
The late, distinguished media scholar C. Edwin Baker identified some of the most troubling sources when he argued that
"the greatest threat of censorship in this country comes not from
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 13, 15 (2011).
3.

Id. at 13-14.

4.
5.

See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).

NoTRE

4

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 25

the government, but from advertisers and, more generally, from
the failure of free markets to provide either the news and
entertainment that we want or that we need."' In part, demands
and pressures from advertisers, as well as other market dynamics,
drive media institutions to keep important information from the
public that they believe might be too dull or unwelcome.' Of
course, much of this problem is attributable to the public's desire
for more entertaining than informing fare, and so presents the
classic problem of the chicken and the egg-does media "dumb
down" its product because the public demands it, or because it
believes that is what primarily sells? This is an intractable problem that will not be easily solved.
Another of the contributing authors, Hannibal Travis, deals
with another important source of undesirable media self-censorship. He argues that the government's undue influence over
large media conglomerates has caused substantial censorship by
the media of war critics and anti-war viewpoints. Such influence,
according to Travis, is created by the government's power,
among other things, to control and grant access to war-related
information (sometimes in a preferential way), as well as its
power to influence the larger business interests of those conglomerates. It results, he says, in a reluctance by media companies to take or present strong anti-government stances or
information that might undermine government war efforts,
which in turn results in primarily pro-war information and positions being communicated to the public. In effect, government
and big media conglomerates become partners in war. And,
Travis argues, such filtering of anti-war content in traditional
media channels of television, radio, and newspapers, is now shifting to the Internet by virtue of media conglomerates' involvement in providing Internet access to customers, as well as their
creation and presentation of much content on the Web.
Travis appears to suggest that some ways of addressing these
problems include opposing large consolidations of media interests and, as they pertain specifically to the Internet, maintaining
"innovation, mobility, and flexibility" to disseminate anti-war
information and opinions outside of big media channels.' One
might also argue for increased congressional monitoring of exec6. C. Edwin Baker, Remarks on Market Threats to Press Freedom at the
Angelo State University Symposium: American Values (1998), available at http:/
/www.angelo.edu/events/university-symposium/98-Baker.html.
7. Here I am describing some of Baker's claims at a high level of generality. See id., for his detailed argument.
8. Hannibal Travis, Postmodern Censorship of Pacifist Content on Television
and the Internet, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoL'Y 47, 86 (2011).
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utive branch relationships with big media companies to ensure
that they indeed do not become too symbiotic. But whatever the
solution, it is clear that Travis has hit on a substantial problem of
undesirable media self-censorship. A person need look no further than the self-confessed failure of established media companies to adequately examine and question the justifications for the
Iraq War asserted by the Bush administration in the run-up to
that conflict, justifications which later seemed to dissolve in the
full light of day.9
As to Sedler's argument that "good" forms of media self-censorship are the product of a First Amendment right of silence, I
suspect that the final set of contributors on this topic might
argue that such decisions are more the product of journalistic
codes and ethics rather than constitutional law-particularly
since government is typically not attempting to compel media
companies to disclose sensitive information such as rape victim
names or national security secrets. Indeed, in their article, Clay
Calvert and Mirelis Torres explore the ways in which professional
journalism ethics, combined with legal standards drawn from privacy torts and Federal Communications Commission broadcast
indecency regulations, do and can operate to promote good
media decisions about whether or not to publish vivid images of
U.S. soldiers or civilians killed in wartime.
Calvert and Torres persuasively argue that such photographs
can inform citizens who ultimately must decide whether a war is
worth fighting of the true nature of its costs in a much more
authentic and realistic way than mere literary accounts of battle.
Hence, it is critical to publish such photos absent compelling reasons not to do so, such as to protect victims' families from additional trauma (particularly where less invasive photos exist that
can transmit a similar message). The authors usefully propose a
multi-factor framework that "takes into account variables from
the realms of both [journalistic] ethics and the law,"'o what they
call a "censorship rubric,"" to assist news media editors in making good decisions about whether or not to publish such death
images.
There is no doubt that Calvert and Torres are correct that a
picture can often convey the realities of a situation much more
9. See, e.g., From the Editors, The Times and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004,
at AIO (noting that many articles prior to the Iraq War included data that was
allowed to be printed without challenge or further verification).
10. Clay Calvert & Mirelis Torres, StaringDeath in the Face During Times of
War: W'hen Ethics, Law, and Self-Censorship in the News Media Hide the Morbidity of
Authenticity, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-IcS & Pun. Pot'Y 87, 121 (2011).
11. Id. at 117.
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effectively and powerfully than literary accounts. And they are
also undoubtedly right that, whether they want to see such
images or not, American citizens must be fully apprised of the
consequences of their representatives' decision to wage warincluding both the progress of the war and its human toll. The
government all too often in our times attempts to conceal these
images from the American public, as was evidenced by the Bush
administration's policy (continued from prior administrations)
barring journalists from photographing the coffins of soldiers
killed in Iraq as they arrived back on American soil. 12 When
these stark and shocking war images do become available to the
media, then, the rubric of Calvert and Torres promises to be a
very helpful tool in helping it to weigh both the benefits and
costs of disseminating them.
PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-CENSORSHIP AS TO MEDIA
SOURCES AND FORUMS

Next, George Wright takes on a different form of self-censorship, a form which he argues many individuals engage in consciously or unconsciously when they make choices of what
websites they will use as sources of ideas and information (such
as foxnews.com or msnbc.com), and of which Internet forums
they will choose to communicate with others through (such as a
particular group of Facebook friends, or a chat room or blog
devoted to certain subjects). As Wright and others such as Cass
Sunstein have argued, the Internet creates new risks along with
its benefits, because users now "pull" the information they seek
rather than having that information "pushed" to them as had
been the case with more traditional media channels. The risk
addressed by these authors is that many Internet users will seek
out sources of ideas and information that appear most aligned
with their own thinking, and effectively "censor out" those
sources of ideas, views, and information with which they disagree
or distrust. Wright describes this phenomenon as "input-side
self-censorship,"'" referring to decisions by individuals to con12. Memorandum from the Dep't of Def. regarding the Public Affairs
Guidance-Operation Desert Storm Casualty and Mortuary Affairs (Feb. 6,
1991). See also Press Release, Am. Forces Press Servs., Defense Department to
Allow Photographs of Caskets with Family's Permission (Feb. 26, 2009), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53250
(announcing
reversal of the 1991 policy).
13. R. George Wright, Self-Censorship and the Constrictionof Thought and Discussion Under Modern Communications Technologies, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. PoL'v 123, 125 (2011).
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sume information and views from like-minded sources to the
exclusion of "other-minded" ones.
As a consequence of this "cyberbalkinization," Wright contends, not only is public discourse impaired, but so too is an individual's ability to think broadly and in a fair-minded way. Public
discourse is degraded because the more like-minded individuals
exchange views together to the exclusion of differing views, the
more extreme those views become-resulting in a more
polarized and less civic public debate. Less exposure to differing
viewpoints and sources of information also impairs the thought
processes of individuals, because their thinking becomes narrower, and their minds become less able and willing to appreciate the positions of others who espouse differing views.
To counter this trend, Wright advocates cultivating the pursuit of truth in matters of politics as a civic and personal virtue, a
quest that takes priority over and "constrain [s] our substantive
political commitments."' 4 Presumably, those who would take
such a pursuit seriously would willingly seek out and consider
information and ideas that did not fit comfortably into their own
worldview-expanding both the reaches of their own thinking
and, hopefully, their tolerance for the differing views of others.
As examples of role models to emulate in this regard, Wright
appropriately points to the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and
the scientist Charles Darwin.
Another person that might be included in this group is Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr., and his immortal defense of freedom of speech as a means of producing a marketplace of
competing ideas in which truth eventually emerges to the detriment of those who remain wedded to their "fighting faiths.""
Surely Holmes would have supported the cultivation of the virtue
Wright proposes, for a marketplace in which groups of participants shopped only with select merchants without considering
the wares of others, would hardly produce the benefits of competition that marketplaces are designed to foster. And so, it might
be emphasized, the pursuit of truth is not only a civic and personal virtue worth cultivating for its own sake, but also because it
lies at the heart of one of the most cherished rights for which this
country stands.

14. Id. at 141.
15. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
dissenting).

(Holmes,

J.,

8

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF IAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 25

PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT CENSORSHIP OF MEDIA

The last group of this edition's contributors addresses the
more commonplace censorship problem of government regulation of the media, but in the decidedly non-commonplace contexts of terrorism trials, extreme video game violence, and
invasions of privacy in cyberspace. With respect to terrorism trials, Derigan Silver considers the intersection of the Court's decisions that have created a general First Amendment right of the
public, including the media, to attend judicial proceedings, with
other decisions that have recognized the need to defer to executive branch decisions regarding the withholding of information
from the public for national security reasons. Obviously, the trials of alleged terrorists implicate both sets of concerns when the
Justice Department argues that aspects of such trials and related
records have to be closed to the public in order to protect U.S.
national security interests. In such cases, censorship of the
media is implicated only insofar as a court agrees to such closure
requests and denies the media access to information that the government produces pursuant to such proceedings.
Silver argues that when they are ruling on closure requests
in such cases, courts ought to adopt the presumption of access
that the Supreme Court has established in the First Amendment
right of access cases, rather than the presumption of secrecy or
deference that he contends governs cases involving the denial of
access to national security information. Consistent with such a
presumption of access, he contends, the government should
have to demonstrate a compelling need for closure and that its
request is narrowly tailored to address that need. Such a presumption of access is all the more appropriate, in Silver's view,
given the passage of a recent federal law that mandates certain
procedures for judges to follow when classified information is
used in federal prosecutions-assisting them with striking the
proper balance between security concerns and public access in
such proceedings. Further, permitting public and media access
in terrorism trials except where truly necessary to protect
national security interests will adequately maintain transparency
in our judicial proceedings, therefore retaining the public's trust
and confidence in the government's efforts to both combat terrorism and try suspected terrorists in a fair manner.
Silver is surely right that transparency in the way the government tries suspected terrorists is just as important in this area of
the law as in others. Citizens must have confidence that the government is not only effectively fighting terrorism, but also that
the government is doing so in a just and fair way-for instance,
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in a way that does not unfairly target persons because of their
ethnicity or religion, or that does not target non-serious threats
in order to claim victories in the war against terror. Moreover, as
the late Louis Henkin and others have frequently argued,' government officials routinely over-classify information that does not
present serious national security risks, not only because it is an
easier way to go but also because knowledge is power, and government officials do not share that eagerly or wish to provide
their potential detractors with any more information than they
have to.
Silver's presumption of access argument, then, has much
force. The challenge for courts will be how to apply what is effectively a strict scrutiny standard of review to closure decisions that
also operates to adequately protect true national security secrets.
In other words, courts will need to be convinced that such a standard of review can be applied in this area in a way that is not
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact."17 And for that guidance they
can look to the Court's affirmative action decisions where that
tribunal has been forced to make strict scrutiny review more of a
realistic balancing test than the fatal blow to government regulation it normally is in order to preserve some space for valid
affirmative action plans.'
Moving to a more standard form of government censorship
than denials of access to government information, Kevin Saunders addresses the constitutionality of restrictions many States
have recently been placing on the ability of the video game retailers to sell extremely violent games directly to minors-typically
ones where players are encouraged to inflict gratuitous and
extreme acts of violence on others (all in a virtual way, of
course). The video game industry has been challenging such
restrictions as violations of the First Amendment, and lower
courts have generally been sustaining such claims. One of these
16. See Louis Hen kin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of
the PentagonPapers, 120 U. PA. L. RFv. 271, 275-76 (1971) ("Without any doubt
. . . Government frequently withholds more and for longer than it has to. Officials . .. tend to resolve doubts in favor of non-disclosure. Some concealment is
improperly motivated-to cover up mistakes, to promote private or partisan
interests, even to deceive another branch or department of government, or the
electorate.").
17. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995 (citing
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment)).
18. See id. at 227 (holding that all racial classifications must be analyzed
under strict scrutiny); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding
under strict scrutiny the University of Michigan Law School's race-based "plus"
factor admissions program).
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lower court decisions is presently under consideration by the
Supreme Court."
Drawing from various historical sources, such as the personal correspondence of key members of the founding generation and relevant literature of the day, Saunders makes a
persuasive case that the Constitution's framers would have been
extremely surprised, and likely upset, to learn that the "freedom
of speech" they enshrined into our fundamental guarantees
encompasses the right of video game distributors to peddle
extreme fare to minors absent the approval of their parents. As
he demonstrates, the founding generation was especially concerned with the proper upbringing and education of children in
order to develop individuals who would become productive and
virtuous citizens of American society. They also recognized, as
common sense seems to suggest, that children are highly impressionable and susceptible to deleterious influences up to an age
where they can make mature and independent judgments of
their own. Hence, Saunders contends, anyone who purports to
take originalism seriously as a method of interpreting the Constitution has a heavy burden to shoulder in using the First Amendment as a basis for invalidating State laws regulating the access of
minors to video games that promote virtual acts of extreme
violence.
However, as Saunders and other observers of the Court
surely know, originalism is only one method of interpretation
that body utilizes to answer the many constitutional questions
that come before it, and typically it does not explain its reasons
for utilizing one method versus another in a particular case.2 o
And under its modern jurisprudence, once the Court decides
that First Amendment protections should apply to a given situation, it normally invalidates (pursuant to strict scrutiny) any regulation of expression that seeks to address potential harms caused
by its content. Its principal justification for doing this is to
ensure that the government is not merely censoring the content

19. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S.Ct. 2398 (2010). See also Transcript of Oral
Argument, Schwarzenegger v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n, No. 08-1448 (Nov. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-tran
scripts/08-1448.pdf.
20. See Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other "Abridgements" of
Scientific Research: The Proper Scope ofJudicialReview Under the FirstAmendment, 54

EMORY L.J. 979 (2005).
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because it dislikes it under the pretext of addressing harms allegedly caused by it."
One would hope the Court will recognize that when states
essentially tell video game retailers they cannot sell their extreme
games to minors without the permission of their parents, those
governments are not censoring anything. Rather, they are simply
directing retailers to have parents buy such games for their children if the latter want them and their parents approve. Perhaps
then the Court will also recognize that its modern approach to
content-based regulations of speech is simply inadequate to
address the problem of minors and extreme video game violence, and that an originalist analysis such as that advocated by
Saunders might provide a sounder point of departure for deciding these cases.
Our final contributor, Terence Lau, explores the capacity of
Internet communications to invade a person's privacy and harm
their reputation in a shorter time, across a wider space, and for a
longer duration, than any medium of communication heretofore
known. Lau argues that particularly in cases where individuals
have not voluntarily "established a presence" on the Internet,
and have not contributed to incidents where Internet users
invade their privacy or defame them in that medium, remedies
that might be provided by existing tort actions or statutory protections are inadequate to provide any real redress. Hence, he
advocates a form of new statutory protection called "Zero Net
Presence" (ZNP), which gives the injured person a "right to
demand [that] a website operator or internet service provider
remove and scrub all traces of their name or identity if they
wish."" In other words, instead of making futile attempts to
redress their harms by going after anonymous or otherwise
unreachable perpetrators of Internet abuse, under Lau's proposal such victims would be able to demand that Internet media
operators remove the offending content from their channels of
communication. In essence, Lau is advocating the creation of a
new form of government-authorized censorship in the form of a
statutory right to have Internet media operators excise allegedly
damaging content.
Of course, government censorship can take both good and
bad forms in ways that parallel Sedler's categories of good and
21.

See Barry P. McDonald,

Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content

Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. RExV. 1347
(2006).
22. Terence J. Lau, Towards Zero Net Presence, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. Pot'v 237, 271 (2011).
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bad media self-censorship. Many would argue that government
restrictions on forms of harmful or "low value" expression that
the Court has adjudged to be undeserving of full First Amendment protection, such as libel, obscenity, or threats, constitute
good forms of censorship. The same people would likely argue
that any restrictions or burdens placed on fully protected expression constitute undesirable forms of it. The challenge for Lau's
proposal would be how to determine on which side of the line
the allegedly harmful speech fell before his "ZNP right" could
constitutionally be applied, and even then how to get beyond
concerns that such a right might be unduly vague or broad, or
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint. But his analogy to
certain copyright law procedures, where Internet media operators can be forced to take down allegedly infringing content in
some cases, offers some tantalizing possibilities for enforcing,
consistent with the First Amendment, some form of ZNP right
that seem worthy of further exploration.
In conclusion, this symposium edition of the Notre Damejournal of Law, Ethics 6&Public Policy provides valuable discussions of

difficult problems in the critical area of censorship and the
media. I am confident that any serious student of these matters
will find much in these contributions that illuminates these
problems and offers promising avenues for dealing with them.
Hopefully, such insights will ultimately help to foster even more
robust and valuable flows of expression within our society.

